Is religion opposed to art

CHAPTER THREE: RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY - A DIFFERENT IDENTITY OR: RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY AS SELF-REFLECTION OF PHILOSOPHY 1. I take up the thread of Hegel's insight that the object of religion and philosophy is the same, so that only their medium differs The common denominator is that here, as there, it is a matter of mediating between the absolute and the finite: once, of course, in religion, we saw it, in imagination and cult, in which the medium of feeling and affects constitute an undeniable component; the other time in philosophy in the form of the concept. Of course, one will also have to recognize the factual limits of the Hegelian parallelization. They come into play wherever form and medium jump over to the matter and preform its understanding. It would therefore make sense to speak of an identity of scope and range rather than object identity. But the philosophical relationship is, as much as its questions will have an existential pull - and should never be denied in any argumentative differentiation? - but written in the attitude of 'Theoria'. It seeks to prove itself contemplatively, and this contemplation, according to Aristotle: a divine ability, as it were, to which man ultimately does not reach, an inner, autonomous movement that leads beyond all external movement, creates distance. The distance means that it transforms agonizing doubt or mystical unity coincidence into methodical doubt. A detachment to the point of irony is her own. Since it is genuinely obliged to enlightenment and self-enlightenment, it receives an independence and autonomy in relation to the expectations and demands of total experiments of religions, which let jump into the overly void. At the same time, she remains cool about their claim to a transforming design of life, as it is formulated in Christian terms as 'Metanoia'. Philosophy thus lends itself to a serenity and the opportunity to play that 'homo religiosus' cannot afford. It is precisely the Christian evocation of folly, of a cross that ad absurdum every self-redemption through wisdom, will not only be stoic, but will be rejected by every philosopher. In terms of content, it also affects his way of life and thought. Especially when there is an identity of the range, religions and philosophy come into conflict, which have ostensibly and historically documented in the question of who is the maid and who is the mistress. But they can also become fruitful when they pass into a mutual self-questioning of the other, a need for legitimation. 2 Philosophy of religion, and not, as Leo Strauss and his students said, 3 Political philosophy is thus the point at which the philosophical way of life in the Whole compared to a different way of life and thought is up for debate. Whether and how the believer, the 'homo religiosus', can be a philosopher at the same time, and how this will then change his philosophical existence and way of working, this is the question that overrides the other about the relationship between philosophy and civic or civic existence. Also for the religious-po- 1 This is, as is well known, the basic concept of Hegel; see ders., Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, Theory-Werkausgabe. Volume 10, p. 366 (§§ 366 ff.). See also Theunissen, Hegel's doctrine of the absolute spirit, op. Cit., Pp. 60 ff. And pp. 77 ff. 2 This is the actual analytical-hermeneutical conclusion that I draw in the following from Hegel's approach. 3 See above all H. Meier, Das theologische -politische Problem. On the subject of Leo Strauss. Stuttgart 2003; see also in view of a counterpoint to Strauss: Ders., About the happiness of philosophical life. Reflections on Rousseau's Rêveries. Munich 2011. Here there is an exaggeration of Strauss’s tendencies, which, however, remain in line with them. See the pleasantly spaced statements in H. Ottmann, History of political thinking. The 20th century. Totalitarianism and its overcoming. Stuttgart, Weimar 2010, p. 470 ff. 501 litical problem, the basic pattern can already be recognized in ancient Socrates. He establishes a philosophical belief that asks about the one divine ('to theion') in the many gods. If there were a relationship of indifference, as a reducing concept of philosophy suggests, then philosophies and religions hardly touch each other. The key point, which can only be evoked thetically here: Before a metaphysical self-understanding of philosophy, the philosophy of religion is not one discipline of philosophical thought alongside others, moreover, a comparatively marginal sub-discipline that is located in a no-man's-land between theoretical and practical philosophy, which is difficult to define. Rather, the philosophy of religion brings the philosophical formation of concepts to the point at which it regards itself in relation to something external. It can also split this view from itself in a superficial relationship of enlightenment. But divisions turn against their originator. If one applies a motive of psychoanalysis, they keep themselves in sterile purity by destroying the other and in the end remain illusory. In the case of philosophy, this can already be seen in a superficial first look at its history in the fact that its genealogy, at least in the West, would be incomprehensible if one disregarded the contrast to religion. Philosophers from the pre-Socratics to Wittgenstein or Heidegger have formulated their self-image towards her. One can move a category such as subjectivity to the beginning of the search for certainty, one can grasp finitude as an inevitable horizon of philosophical questioning. But can subjectivity, if it has a super-empirical cohesion and is perhaps to be useful as a principle, think differently than after modeling an 'intellectus archetypus'? And: is a concept of finitude comprehensible without regard to infinity and absoluteness as their limiting antidote? As is well known, Descartes and Leibniz indicated this elementary principle of rationalist metaphysics, that only the finite can be derived from the infinite, but not vice versa.4 Even if the principle as such does not have to be maintained: that a thought of finite intelligibility only comes before a borderline thought of absolute intelligibility It can be understood that a justification remains dependent on a dimension of its ground, however only suspected amorphous, should be confirmed by the fact that these relationships also catch the eye of the critic, who indicates the subreptions of such philosophical-metaphysical basic relationships. Nevertheless, one cannot and must not simply reverse the line of argument. Feuerbach's supposed insight that God is only a projection of a sublimated anthropology inevitably falls into the trap of not being able to show where that sublimation comes from. 2. There are good reasons why what is offered here is nothing more and nothing less than a hand-drawn sketch of the congenial relationship between religion and the philosophical interpretation of the world. It can only be redeemed in larger transdisciplinary frameworks with a focus on questions of fundamental philosophy. However, one can at least use the 4 Cf. on this point the concise view of Pannenberg, theology and philosophy. Their relationship in the light of their shared history, op. Cit., Pp. 142 ff. Also still worthwhile: H. Heimsoeth, Metaphysik der Neuzeit. Reprint Munich 1967. PART TWO: PROBLEMS AND PHENOMENAS 502 different threads of the question in view, in a 'canon' that is configured according to different sides. In the sense of this canon, it should be indicated how the interpretive relationship will be mutually portrayed: (a.) It could begin with a philosophical concept of nature. This will be multidimensional in the relationship between philosophy and religion and will not be satisfied with the world that can be simulated mathematically and physically. What religions mean in the dimension of creation or the phenomenally inescapable of the world has its equivalent in a teleological and cosmomorphic understanding of nature. Kant stated that natural philosophy must, as far as this is at all possible, get by with the assumption of a 'mechanism'. But a mechanistic reductionism to the supposedly unprecedented first does not even cover the inner connection between life, becoming and passing away; Nor does it capture the diversity of species and their variances, which could be represented as a game in an anthropomorphic interpretation. A teleological approach, which, as Kant teaches, can in no way be shown as a determinable property of nature as a whole in a rational and demonstrative way, shows the inevitable interaction between the members of an organism.5 It is the prerequisite for gaining a concept of life. The concept of nature per se has been connected with beginning and firstness. This is already expressed linguistically when the Latin and also the Greek term ('nasci' / 'phyein') refer to being by itself, to initial beginnings. At the same time, the concept of nature and its early spellings indicate that this beginning remained veiled and hidden. If philosophy wants to emphasize this excess over the respective model formations, the physicalistic or life science conceptions - and its genuinely philosophical point of view depends on it - then it draws on the evocation power of religions, partly through art and poetry. For literature and other arts have retained these evocative powers for a long time, even if they were drawn into the maelstrom of secularization.6 On the other hand, the philosophical approach will of course capture the meaning of primary religious speech, but decipher its semantics and thus subject it to a critique of meaning. Religious speech about creation, cosmogony and primordial genesis will then have to be understood as analogical speech, as speech in images and metonymies that are not free of referents and functions, but whose core can also be spelled out without images. In all the religions of revelation and the scriptures, the debate revolved around this question of an independent, purely rational reformulation of the revealed evidence of the Holy Scriptures. (b.) A second field in which the complementary interpretation of religion and philosophy, their finding of oneself in the other, can be continued is identified with the sign of 'anthropology'. Although anthropology now and then acts as the key to philosophical questions, the relationship is actually much more complex. Ancient Den- 5 This is especially developed in the teleological judgment of the third Kantian critique. See: R. Löw, The Philosophy of the Living. The concept of the organic in Kant, its reason and its topicality. Frankfurt / Main 1980. 6 This shows in large narrative arcs Taylor, Ein säkulares Zeitalter, loc. Cit., Pp. 354 ff. CHAPTER THREE: RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY? A DIFFERENT IDENTITY 503 saw the recognizability of man ultimately veiled. That is why the anthropological question was equated with the riddle of the Sphinx. Anyone who touched them ran the risk of being struck by the envy of the gods. It is not without reason that Oedipus is the one who guessed the Sphinx riddle. The Aristotelian determination that man is 'zoon logon echon' and 'zoon politikon' is resolved from this mythical horror. But it remains unsatisfactory in some respects.7 Because it conceals the basic problem that just as little as the eye sees itself, man is not transparent to himself either. In the attempt at self-knowledge, the one who knows and the one who is to be known are one and the same. Religions design a norm of human existence, starting, basic and target concepts. They give him a perspective from which he cannot see himself directly, but through which he can grasp himself as in a mirror image that throws him his original image. The image of God is a formulation of this unquestioned reason. Human reason can gain a concept of its anthropological conditioning that lies not only in its evolutionary genesis, but also in the stratifications of the unconscious, the emotional, not least the incommensurability of the gender difference, if it is based on such a basic consciousness as an instantaneous sense of self Coming back, identifying and testing yourself. Henri de Lubac spoke of the “tragedy of a humanism without God”, which presumably could not sustain itself at all, in complete denial of this reason and without being able to put anything else on its side. It may be sufficient to record the trace of the 'imago Dei', distorted by pain, on the human features of the sufferer as the inevitable ground of a 'philosophia passionis', 9 which also inscribes its transcendent meaning in the decisions and search for freedom of finite people and is the basis of universal human dignity . (c.) In questions of ethics and political philosophy, religion is a sharpening and counterpart in one for the attempts at philosophical concept formation. It is precisely in these fields that the aim will be to develop figures of secular ethics that are not limited to rules of prudence and also not to develop game-theoretical considerations in an advantageous manner, as suggested by hedonism and many forms of utilitarianism.10 Philosophy will also recognize that a religious justification and legitimation of politics crosses a boundary whose intangibility is closely connected with the problem history of the relationship between religion and politics in modern times. Religions will never find their goal in such legitimizations. Philosophy can draw attention to this. Since Socrates it has been related to the questioning of the good life and political manifestations. Since antiquity, however different the paths of justification may be, the question of the good life has participated indirectly from that of the divine. 7 This is the meaning of the tragic wisdom, sensed by Nietzsche, at the basis of the determination of the Logos. If, in the sense of Klaus Heinrich, one also understands religion as that which is repressed in philosophy, it will be difficult to dispense with this dimension. 8 Cf. G. Steiner, Why Thinking Makes You Sad. Ten (possible) reasons. Frankfurt / Main 2006. 9 H. de Lubac, The tragedy of a humanism without God. Salzburg 1950 etc. 10 An exception here is preferential utilitarianism, which comes close to Kant's choice of maxims. On this, Spaemann, Glück und Wohlwollen, op. Cit., Pp. 45 ff. And pp. 147 ff. SECOND PART: PROBLEMS AND PHENOMENA 504 In the past few years the question of whether monotheisms due to their exclusion of other deities eo ipso to a greater extent has been discussed Would be prone to violence. In any case, a late-time naive idea, not free from folkloric traits, is that polytheistic forms of religion or religious forms that extend into an apersonality of the divine, the religious practice of an all-unity concept, are, as it were, naturally peaceful.11 There are good reasons for doubting this ; and this also before empirical-historical religious studies, such as a look at Tibetan Buddhism. But here is another, much more fundamental question to be raised. It must be examined whether and to what extent religious practice has emancipated itself from the manifestations of the political or whether a theocratic unity is still preserved. The absence of exceptions of the legal law, but at the same time the situation-related question of the “possible best”, as initially based on the philosophical inquiries of Greek antiquity, have correspondences in every case in religions: on the one hand in the validity of the commandment, on the other hand in the ultimate and highest Ideal of life united with this. Philosophy runs the risk of sterilizing itself if it does not see these entanglements. Heteronomies of religions, on the other hand, will have to expose and critically reflect on a philosophical critique of religion. There is something else: secular forms of argumentation can often only indicate how the extreme limits of the ethical field are represented. If the exemptions of the divine law can be translated into secular languages, as Kant quite naturally does with the justification of the categorical imperative, then this is only possible if the religious “embers” are still known. A later emancipation from this starting point is conceivable. It will develop persuasiveness when the secular reasoning is acceptable for its own sake. As an ethical principle, it can only be substantiated with plausibility, be evident and have a motivating effect. Practical reason can hardly claim a compelling final justification due to the structure of "knowledge in order to act" established by Aristotle. Their strict terms have soft edges, for example in the sense in which 'justice' refers to 'equity'. Against this background, Plato in VII.Letter pointed out that it would be impropriety if one did not know how to distinguish where final justification is possible and necessary and where not. Kant also stated in one of the formulas that the categorical imperative should not only be understood as an invariably valid natural law, but also in the form of a divine commandment.12 The reality of evil extends further than the abstraction of a 'privatio boni' Philosophy late and hesitant. As Kant already made clear, evil is a tendency that cannot be compensated for by catching up on enlightenment and reflexivity.13 It is itself a negative intelligible power, and Schelling then has it at the center of an anthropodic and genealogy of negation in the ground itself thought. However: Just as a legal law does not know how to determine its own conditions of interpretation, just as little is the normativity of the moral law able to foresee its abuse on its own. 11 Cf. the tendencies in Assmann, The Mosaic Distinction or The Price of Monotheism, loc. Cit. 12 See in detail above, p. 225 ff. 13 Cf. first part of this book above, p. 230 ff. THIRD CHAPTER: RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY? A DIFFERENT IDENTITY 505 When Hegel evokes the topic of forgiveness between perpetrator and victim, this sign of extreme asymmetry, which is at all conceivable in a sought-for relationship of recognition, as the key to the world of morality, then it is at the same time clear that philosophy is decentering here undergoes. This key cannot be deduced from any principle, just as Schelling knew that the reality of freedom and the acknowledgment of evil must go beyond all system forms. What happens in detail can very well be stated in the term; and Hegel goes so far that he sees Fichte's formula of identity 'I am I' only redeemed in the acknowledgment and mutual reflection of the guilty subject towards the victim: not as abstract self-certainty, but as a dignified coming to oneself Others. However, this must be preceded by a narrative and a way of dealing with these shallows, manifested in rituals. Judaism and Christianity perhaps more than other world religions portray this dimension: the return to Sinai, the conversion in every moment of life is considered possible. Christian is then the overcoming of death and sin, which is visible in the manifestation of the cross. Philosophical ethics will take an interest in the ethics of religions precisely where their justification processes touch an abyss that is no longer transparent to itself. The trivial objection that religious ethics is always heteronomous has no fundamental validity and is not suitable to refute these observations. Heteronomy always occurs where human prudence does what is required out of fear of punishment or through the desire to receive an eternal (quite beautifully earthly painted) reward and omits the forbidden. It is therefore difficult to deny that heteronomous motives occur in pre-conventional and conventional levels of morality.14 But this does not even begin to affect a transcendent relationship into which subjectivity and social system are drawn as if by themselves. What is commanded is sacred to him because it results from a will which, even as divine will, should be able to count as unreservedly holy. If, with Kant, autonomy has to be understood as self-legislation, which does not apply to any arbitrary content of the will, but to the absolutely recognized a priori moral law, it remains connected with the archetype of the commandment. But this is so in the narrative between God and his people that the failure of the commandment can also be articulated in a basic matrix. When the culturalist conditionality and limitation of religious ethics is discussed, on the other hand, multiple overlaps and connections can be noted. It is certainly thanks to Hans Küng that he pointed out such analogies and correspondences under the title of the 'Global Ethic'.15 The fact that virtually all world religions and cultures know and take to heart formulas such as the Golden Rule is on an ethical level to establish a consensuality that invites us to be poured into a rational reconstruction. However, contrary to what Küng thinks, the actual religious dimension is not affected. It does not even outline the basic features of a universal religion, as it had in mind in the 18th century and as it was with the Illuminati and Freemasons. See J. Habermas, Explanations on Discourse Ethics. Frankfurt / Main 1991. 15 See Küng, Projekt Weltethos, loc. Cit., Pp. 25 ff. PART TWO: PROBLEMS AND PHENOMENOS 506 were further cultivated. At most, a secondary motivational context is opened up for ethical normativity, the foundation of moral laws in a relationship with God or redemption. That is why the global ethic does not touch the heart of individual religions. And it is one of the illusions associated with the idea of ​​a future religion of reason that it should be primarily an ethical religion. Then all depth differences in belief and rite would like to be abolished in that future 'Third Reich', a future form of religion that combines higher reason and a comprehensive ritual morality. Meanwhile: that religious lingua franca without arcanum, as it is extended today in the recognizable dilution of the “religio duplex” conception of the 18th century Küng before the highly justified objective that there can be no world peace without religious peace, 16 could essentially also be extended train in a non-religious ethics concept. That is why the peaceful solution of the global ethic will not penetrate the inner core of the motivations from religions. Nietzsche recognized this in a remarkable way when he noted that the death of God was first of all the death of the moral God.17 The 'glowing core' and the interference zone, which are revealing for a philosophical secular ethic, open up precisely where religions the pattern of 'you shall' break and contain its own ontology, that of the promise of the other state. The Kantian and post-Kantian moral philosophy has masterfully analyzed the paradox that lies in the connection between law and freedom. I perceive myself as free insofar as I commit myself to the moral law. And Wittgenstein brings ethics and religion into close proximity because they both have in common not to increase theoretical knowledge about the world, but to lead it into a different world state. This seems to indicate a dimension of redemption, which the philosophical concept can no longer name, and which therefore leads to the problem of evil as its sting and antithesis. (d.) Philosophy, long before there was an independent aesthetic as a discipline, dealt with the question of the beautiful and its transparency on the otherworldly and on the divine. The diaphany of the forms on a no longer visible, divine ground gives the beautiful the character of an excess of reality. That is why the thought came up early on that art did not actually imitate the real world, that it might be the other way around. This means more precisely: the coding of the world-ideas in the beautiful and not simply the mimesis of a reality shines and shines through.18 The highest glory transcends the dimensions of inner-worldly relations. The ordinary is transfigured in it. When the philosopher approaches the relationship between archetype and copy, when he wants to develop a theory of the beautiful and the sublime, which extends from the judgment of the subject to the materialization of a supernatural power in worldly figurations, he is at the same time involved in the coding of the beautiful encountered the sacred and the complement of religions. 16 Assmann, Religio duplex, op. Cit. 17 Nietzsche, Also sprach Zarathustra, KSA 4, p. 250 ff. And in total the fourth book of the 'Zarathustra' poetry, which configures this topos before the problem of redemption and being redeemed. 18 This is the echo of the talk of the 'mimesis of the absolute' (Hegel) or of 'putting the truth into work' (Heidegger). CHAPTER THREE: RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY? A DIFFERENT IDENTITY 507 The possibility of making transcendence appear in the beautiful is at the same time called into question in the light of transcendence. The deepest unity of the human and the divine cannot be represented. It leads to a limbo and a luminous nothing opens up in it. Because: the power of the divine is by no means only subject to monotheistic religions, but also to the dimensions of Buddhism that dissolve individual figures and which call visualization into question. It is precisely in this that experience of God differentiates and? Speak, what Hegel noted as a genuine medium of religion: that it is 'imagination'. Imagination should not be confused with making a present that sought to erase deprivation. Even the name of Jehovah has to be paraphrased, calligraphy takes the place of portrayal in Islam, Christian belief brought to mind kenosis, the broken body on the cross, representable, tangible and a nuisance to other religions because it is absolutely contrary to glory or eternity and transpersonality of the divine. TS Eliot's statement that art is always only a simulation of religion, but with it one has “the real thing”, may go too far.19 But it shows that art lives from the beginning and origins of the experience of God.20 The spectrum ranges from imitation in a late modern age by Wagner or Stefan George to the transfiguration of the ordinary as a sacralization of the given that remains entirely in the factual. Last but not least, art crosses the border between the representable and the non-representable in various modulations; it may border on a pain and a lament that no longer open to the articulated word, or it may suggest a convergence of the greatest and the smallest, since it closes itself off from the picture. If that primacy of the transfiguration of the world, "metamorphosis," generation is to be articulated conceptually, art, incidentally precisely that of modernity, opens up in traces to the fundamental contradiction of transcendence. A few anchor points of this relationship will be recalled in more detail later. The relationship between religion and art will be discussed in a separate chapter below. (e.) Even before the question of time and history, philosophy will eminently come up against the limits of religion. Religions always oppose the linear concepts of time in the secular world with an antidote: the most common form is the mythical repetition structure, which recurs in annual festivals and their cyclicality. It covers the change, it will be experienced as progress or it will be experienced as loss and impermanence, with the membrane skin of that which has always been, i.e. that which returns. It is different with the messianic expectation of time. It is by no means to be mapped to a progress topology. Rather, it uses blockages, in the sense of Gershom Scholem's famous crack in the door through which the Messiah can enter. This thought remains remarkable, whether it was invented by Scholem or whether it was derived from the interpretation of the Kabbalistic writings 19 TS Eliot's statement here according to: R. Spaemann, Art is Always Simulation, in: J. Ritter, Lectures on Philosophical Aesthetics, ed. by U. von Bülow and M. Schweda. Göttingen 2011, p. 179 ff. 20 Cf. also Steiner, Von realer Gegenwart, loc. Cit., P. 20 ff .; H. Belting, The Real Picture. Image questions as questions of faith. Munich 2005. Balthasar, Herrlichkeit, allows a particularly large-scale view of this problem. A theological aesthetic, loc. Cit. SECOND PART: PROBLEMS AND PHENOMENA 508 emerges. This view of history knows that the future does not have to mean redemption and that the rubble and ruins of the past are set against it. Christian understanding of time, on the other hand, extends the 'not yet', the interpretation of the experienced and tangible history as in need of redemption, through the momentum of an eschatological 'already': in the first arrival of Jesus Christ the future has already dawned, and from here it is how Paul put it, set a center for time. The story of Jesus happened "once and for all", which means: it defies a mere linearity of the chronological sequence, but its sense of time has nothing in common with the eternal return of the same in myth.21 All remaining time is under the sign of this Expectation of an imminent parousia nothing but the end of the day. The foundation of a Christian theology and philosophy of history, which also devotes its attention to the form of the church and the even more abstract topos of the catechon, is ultimately a reaction to this waiting. It is therefore not without irony when in epochs of apocalyptic end-time expectation such as in the late Middle Ages, in order to do justice to the end times, inventions and innovations take shape that should contribute to a perpetuation and stabilization of the history of civilization.22 In view of the European philosophy of history of the last two centuries, which has to do with many short-circuited and cruel reactions to the Christian-Jewish conception of the goal and end of history, one should know how these resistant, religious conceptions of time, subject to the senses of time, correspond to that measurable, progress-calibrated time that at the same time evokes finiteness in which Occidental rationality is generally articulated. The philosophy of history can only be fruitful in a counterfactual sense, especially after the end of totalitarian ideologies and the age of technocratic planning hybris. As Kant put it, it is concentrated on individual “historical signs” from which a possible rational progression of history can become visible. It would be an illusion that linear progress determined their course from there. How remembering and forgetting, how expectation and reason are to be thought in history, requires meditation, as it were, in a sense of time that leaves the trivial, common ones behind. 3. As sketchy as all of this is: What is implied is that at a last and 'highest' level of observation, philosophy can also understand itself in its disciplinary structures and in the orientation it takes as a whole, in an exciting opposition to religions. Wherever it remains in continuity with its history, it will ask about the first and last reasons, about the conditions of a good and just life, about God, the world and man. Insofar as it ignores this and does not even find a distant guiding maxim in it, it would become a single science among others, which even presupposes that single science as a fact. It may play its part in even the most virtuosic argumentation analysis and ethical detailed considerations, as a formal individual discipline in conjunction with brain research or high-tech gene therapy, it may become the 'philosophy of media cultures' or the 'philosophy of social sciences' (and countless other shadows - 21 Paul, Romans 6, 10. This is why Bultmann's concept of a 'demythologizing Christianity' already ignores this fundamentally non-mythological sense of time.22 Still very stimulating: J. Fried, Aufstieg aus dem Untergang. Apocalyptic thinking and the origin of the Modern Science in the Middle Ages. Munich 2001. CHAPTER THREE: RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY? A DIFFERENT IDENTITY 509 would be conceivable); if it reveals its transcendence of reflection, it cannot for its part take into its reflection rationality, language, and research programs of such disciplines and incorporate them into its pull of doubt. The more it narrows scientifically, the more philosophy becomes arbitrary. In addition, her own genealogies and their essential questions are no longer accessible to her. Such a narrowing does not only come from scientism. In the field of practical reason, it is also the adaptation to a pre-shaped social reality of the present, such as the lack of questioning of a pragmatic and secular thought scheme, which to accept from the start would deprive philosophy of its competence to inquire about the good, the just, about freedom . Limitations and practical constraints then give the punctual solution schemes their form. The point at which the opinions will mainly split is whether philosophy can be more than working through a model and, under certain circumstances, “solving” individual problems. You can usually achieve consensus with a supposedly sophisticated minimalism. The fact that a rationality that is as antiseptic and sterile as possible, that locks oneself in laboratory conditions and does not want to notice the flow of heat and cold from the outside world, creates one's own 'sleep of reason' remains unnoticed.That the magic of this problem-solving, to which one succumbs in the early phases of logical positivism, is mostly only a "dissolution", an abortion of the experiment of questioning and self-questioning when terms such as "God" or "transcendence" have been established beforehand the self-revisions in the course of analytical philosophy are impressively shown. If no referents given to sensual observation can be found on the terms 'God' and 'World', then this does not mean, conversely, that such a referent could not be found in its own linguistic and factual logic. It is often said that a philosophical conception that aims to explain the whole thing is absolutely not worth a damn. Such dogmatic dicta, however, have hardly any evidence of their own. Unless it is an escape from questioning a theoretical framework. Just because philosophy realizes its skeptical self-questioning program and also doubts the structures of the doubt, it will take on a form that can no longer act in the sense of individual investigations and their patterns. The Hegelian dictum that philosophy and religions share their subject matter, but the medium is different, remains helpful for correction and self-examination. It should be noted, of course, that it is not that simple. The medium determines the way in which the object relationships are in turn composed. That broad and significant area, which religions measure through ritual, evocation, and proclamation, is made evident in philosophy in a skepticism that does not exclude doubt and questionability. The downside of such radicalized questioning and self-questioning, which necessarily brings philosophy of religion into close proximity to destruction and criticism of religion, is the search for a reason that is absolutely given and above all relativities. Mixtures and crossings between philosophy and theology, it is advisable to counter the disjunction that Heidegger noted in the discussion with Bultmann - paradigmatically related to Christianity: theology and philosophy are opposed to each other (even if propositional statements seem to be close). HE- SECOND PART: PROBLEMS AND PHENOMENA 510 degger even said that they are 'mortal enemies' because the first one has to refer to the 'positive' of faith in its testimonies, while the other remains in a comprehensive, skeptical questioning movement. All of the sketchy remarks above are by no means intended to signal that the philosophy of religion can or must be the 'system' of philosophy as a whole in a certain respect. It is questionable whether the system form can be an appropriate form in plural, divergent times, which at the same time are inevitably subject to rigorous tests of rationality. Likewise, the question is how a form of thought that intensifies differences and divergences, as it was to be learned from the French thinkers of the eighties, relates to questions of justification of a genuinely metaphysical type, which insists that one will by no means be satisfied with being satisfied with plurality. Religions bring the problem of firstness back into focus, not only theoretically, but also for life orientation. Therefore, the sketch should at least outline some essential and genuine subject areas in which philosophy can come to its own basic and justification claims in relation to religion. The question that thus arises is ambiguous: the separation of religion and philosophy, as institutionalized in modern times, is also conceptually unavoidable. But trivially, this does not mean that the latter - or the respective individual sciences to which she has largely ceded her competence in interpreting the world? would have taken over the potentials of religion or would have taken its place. Such a linear, secularizing reading, as suggested by Emile Durkheim, for example, overlooks the fact that religions are not relics of the past, but develop as a separate dimension of social forms of life.23 But philosophy, as has already been suggested several times, will lead itself to absurdity, they will be extinguished when she is no longer electrified by what her main questions were. Then it becomes a formal or historicist science (also both: formalization and historicization are possible together) alongside others. The competencies are shifting more and more into details that dissolve a connecting tectonics of philosophy. Paradoxically, it will only be able to maintain its independence from scientism if it remains aware that it is located outside the intermediate between science and religions. If, at the end of his 'Philosophy of Religion', Hegel once spoke of the misstep that consisted in the fact that religions outside the realm of the immediate believers could no longer justify themselves in the burgeoning new world, that is, that all mediations of the finite and the absolute threatened to break off The situation is likely to have changed rapidly since then: for philosophy is no longer the epitome of the authority that could justify the concept. It will therefore become increasingly hearing: not only in the reception of human and natural scientific results, but also in the narratives and wisdom of religions; And then, not least, it is active in the reconstruction of their permanent and ineradicable questions, which also includes the destructive postponement: in about 23 Cf. the syncritical chapter on Weber and Durkheim in the first part of the present book, p. 310 ff CHAPTER THREE: RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY? A DIFFERENT IDENTITY 511 Blumenberg and Derrida established the knowledge that they remain where they cannot be supplied with an answer or problem solution. PART TWO: PROBLEMS AND PHENOMENA 512 CHAPTER FOUR: RELIGION AND POLITICS