How Narender Modi knows about PUBG
REASONS FOR DECISION:
The complainant, an Indian citizen, entered Austria illegally on January 14, 2012 and applied for international protection on the following day. He alleged that he had been attacked and injured twice by people from the Congress Party because he had worked with a named person for "the Naxalite Party" and had distributed advertising material. He was also threatened with killing. If he returns to his home country, he is afraid that he will be killed.
With the decision of the Federal Asylum Office of January 17, 2012, FZ. 12 00.671-BAT, the application according to § 3 para. 1 in conjunction with Section 2 (1) no.13 Asylum Act 2005, Federal Law Gazette I No. 100/2005 as amended. BGBl. I No. 38/2011, (in short: AsylG 2005) rejected (point I.) and found that the complainant had the status of beneficiary of subsidiary protection according to § 8 para. 1 in conjunction with § 2 para. 1 no. 13 AsylG 2005 does not apply to his country of origin India (ruling point II.). At the same time, the complainant was expelled from Austria to India in accordance with Section 10 (1) AsylG 2005 (point III.).
The complaint was dismissed as unfounded according to §§ 3, 8, 10 AsylG 2005 with the decision of the Asylum Court of December 19, 2012, number, C11 424381-1 / 2012 / 12E.
On September 9, 2019, the complainant again submitted an application for international protection. In his first questionnaire on September 10, 2019, the complainant stated that his old reasons for fleeing were still upheld, that his life in India was still at risk, and that he had nothing more to add in this regard. The reasons for fleeing remained the same.
When he was interrogated on December 4, 2019, the complainant, when asked why he had made the present application for international protection, stated that the reason was still the same, but that he had applied for asylum again two to three months ago and had received an identity card. The police caught him and asked for his ID, so he applied again. When asked about employment in Germany, he said that he helped someone with the delivery of the newspaper and received money for it. When asked if this was legal, he said it was not reported, but he had to eat somehow. He is not in any clubs or other organizations, he speaks very little German. In India he has uncles and aunts, but there is no contact. He has no contact with his home country, but he is afraid to return. He does not know whether his real reasons for fleeing are still valid, but he suspects that the situation is still the same and that nothing has changed. When he returned, they would harass and beat him again. When asked if there was anything new about his escape argument, he stated that it was still the same.
With the contested decision of the Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum of August 22, 2018, Zl. 1122763008/170173280, the complainant's application for international protection according to § 68 AVG was rejected because of a decided matter (ruling points I. and II.), A residence permit from worthy of consideration Reasons according to § 57 not granted (point III.), According to § 10 para. 1 line 3 AsylG i. V.
m. § 9 BFA-VG issued a return decision against the complainant in accordance with § 52 Paragraph 2 Z. 2 FPG (point IV.) and established that his deportation to India is permissible according to § 46 FPG (point V.) and According to Section 55 (1a) there is no deadline for voluntary departure (point VI.). In accordance with Section 53 (1) in conjunction with (2) FPG, an entry ban for a period of three years was issued against the complainant (point VII.)
From a legal point of view, the Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum stated that there were no changed facts relevant to the decision within the meaning of Section 68 AVG. Since there was no change in the relevant situation, in the request or in the applicable legal norms, which would not make a different legal assessment of the application appear to be excluded from the outset, the legal force of the decision of the Asylum Court of December 19, 2012, Zl . C11 424.381-1 / 2012 / 12E, contrary to his new application, which is why the Federal Office is obliged to reject it.
Furthermore, the Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum stated that the requirements for the granting of a "special protection residence permit" in accordance with Section 57 AsylG were not met. The granting of a residence permit to maintain private and family life within the meaning of Art. 8 ECHR was not required in his case. A return decision should therefore be made. Since the prerequisites of § 50 FPG were not met, his deportation to India was permissible if the prerequisites specified in § 46 para. 1 no. 1 to 4 FPG were met.
Since there is no deadline for voluntary departure in accordance with Section 55 (1a) of the FPG in the event of a rejection decision in accordance with Section 68 AVG, such a deadline should not be granted.
With regard to the entry ban, the BFA stated that since the complainant was obviously not prepared to respect the Austrian legal system and the decisions of the authorities or courts resulting from this legal system in Austria, the authority could only come to the compelling conclusion that his stay in Austria in any case represent a danger to public order and security. In addition, his misconduct falls within the scope of § 53 para. 2 no. 6 FPG, since the complainant is specifically not in a position to prove the means for his maintenance from his own. In addition, it should be taken into account in his case that he has regularly appeared in a criminally relevant manner since his illegal entry. It was entered on 09/02/2013 in the event of theft, on 11/17/2014 when using third-party ID cards and again due to theft, as well as on 02/17/2015, 04/9/2015 due to theft and on 10/26/2017 due to the suppression of documents. The overall assessment of his behavior, his living conditions as well as his family and private points of contact had therefore shown in the course of the weighing decision made by the authority that the issuance of the entry ban for the specified duration was justified and necessary, the endangerment it posed to public order and security prevent.
On the other hand, the complainant lodged a complaint in due time, in which he argued that the complainant had credibly presented facts that had at least a credible core. The new submission is therefore capable of breaking the legal force of the preliminary proceedings. No suitable investigations had taken place. In addition, the complainant had been in Austria since January 2012 and was well integrated, he had always behaved well and there were no negative factors overall. From the beginning he strived for his ability to maintain himself. The authority should at least have issued a residence permit for reasons of Art. 8 ECHR.
II. The Federal Administrative Court has considered:
About the complainant:
The complainant is a national of India, a member of the Jat ethnic group and the Hindu religious community and comes from Haryana. He is healthy and able to work. He has relatives in India. He attended school in India for twelve years.
The complainant has no family ties in the federal territory. He speaks very little German, he does not have any legal employment, he helps someone deliver newspapers and receives money for it. He is not active in any clubs or organizations, he lives with an Indian friend.
The complainant based his renewed application on the same grounds that he had already put forward in his proceedings concerning his first application for international protection. The complainant did not submit any innovations.
The procedure summarized above is also established.
On the situation in India:
KI dated August 9, 2019, lifting of the special status for Jammu and Kashmir (relevant for section 2./Political situation and section 3.1./Regional problem zone Jammu and Kashmir).
On August 5, 2019, India ended the special status laid down in the constitution (ZO 6/8/2019) of the Muslim-majority region (FAZ 6/8/2019) of the Indian part of Kashmir by decree (ZO 6/8/2019). Immediately afterwards, the parliament in Delhi resolved to repeal Article 370 of the Indian Constitution (FAZ 7/8/2019), which grants Jammu and Kashmir a special status and proposed dividing the state into two union territories, namely Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh (IT 6/8/2019). 2019).
Article 370 grants the region a certain degree of autonomy, such as its own constitution, its own flag and the freedom to enact laws (BBC 6/8/2019) with the exception of matters relating to foreign and defense policy (DS 7/8/2019). This represented a compromise between the largely Muslim population and the Hindu leadership in New Delhi (ARTE 7/8/2019).
In addition to Article 370, Article 35A was also repealed, which allowed the local parliament to determine who is a citizen of the state and who can own land and exercise government offices there (NZZ 5.8.2019).
The abolition of autonomy rights, which is also controversial in India, is fueling tensions in the region. Critics fear that the Hindu nationalist Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his government are striving to "Hinduize" the area (TNYT 6/8/2019).
In order to prevent unrest, the Indian authorities interrupted all communication channels, sent an additional 10,000 soldiers (SO August 4, 2019) to the highly militarized region (ARTE 7 August 2019) and leading regional politicians were placed under house arrest (FAZ 7 August 2019), according to media reports More than 500 people have now been arrested during raids in the state of Jammu and Kashmir (HP August 8, 2019).
Pakistan, which also lays claim to the entire region (ORF 5.8.2019), condemns the move as illegal and directs a clear threat to India through the Pakistani military and announces that it will call the UN Security Council (ZO 6.8.2019). The Pakistani Prime Minister Khan warns of the devastating consequences a military conflict could have (FAZ 7/8/2019).
Criticism of the move by the Indian government also comes from Beijing (FAZ 6/8/2019). China's Foreign Minister Hua Chunying has described India's step to abolish the special status of Kashmir as "unacceptable" and "not binding" (SCMP 7/8/2019).
There are isolated reports of minor resistance actions against the actions of the security forces, but these have not been officially confirmed (BBC 7/8/2019).
Most recently, the situation threatened to escalate in February 2019 after dozens of police officers in the region and Hindu nationalists blamed the people of Kashmir for the attack in a suicide attack (ARTE 7/8/2019).
The crisis between India and Pakistan then came to a head that mutual air strikes had occurred [see KI from February 20, 2019].
KI from May 27, 2019, election result Lok Sabha, election to the House of Commons from April 11, 2019 to May 19, 2019 (relevant for Section 2, Political Situation).
India's ruling party BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi has clearly won the parliamentary election in the world's most populous democracy. The Hindu nationalists achieved an absolute majority of the 545 seats in the lower house (SZ 23.5.2019), as emerged on Friday night from the count of the votes cast by the electoral commission. In all likelihood, President Ram Nath Kovind will reappoint Prime Minister Modi for a second five-year term of office as head of government (ZO May 24, 2019), during which he will govern India with a new, larger parliamentary majority (IT May 24, 2019) represents the clearest re-election of an Indian ruling party since 1971 (SZ 23.5.2019).
More than 8,000 candidates ran for the election, which was carried out in seven phases over almost six weeks, from April 11 to May 19 (SZ May 23, 2019). Around two thirds of the approximately 900 million citizens of India who are eligible to vote cast their votes (IT May 24, 2019), which corresponds to a turnout of 67 percent (SZ May 23, 2019). The BJP won a total of 303 constituencies (ECI May 24, 2019; see BBC May 24, 2019).
Opposition leader Rahul Gandhi, head of the Congress Party, which had previously ruled for decades, accepted the defeat and congratulated Modi on his victory (ZO May 24, 2019; see BBC May 23, 2019). The congress party remains the second strongest force in parliament (ZO May 24, 2019). It is expected to improve slightly compared to its worst election result so far five years ago (AJ May 24, 2019).
Modi's populist policy divides the country. During his tenure there was frequent violence by Hindus against Muslims and other minorities. Modi's economic policy is also criticized (ZO May 24, 2019). During the election campaign, he emphasized national security and presented himself as the protector of the South Asian country - especially against the arch enemy Pakistan. Shortly before the election, the neighbors with nuclear weapons almost went to war (SZ May 23, 2019).
According to the Indian Foreign Ministry, some heads of state and government have already congratulated Modi on his election victory, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, China's head of state and party leader Xi Jinping and Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan - even before the election result was official (ZO May 24, 2019) .
Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been holding talks on the formation of a new cabinet since September 25, 2019 (REUTERS May 24, 2019).
KI from 6.3.2019, current events in the Kashmir conflict (relevant for section 3.1./regional problem area Jammu and Kashmir).
India penetrated Pakistani airspace for the first time since the war in 1971 on February 26, 2019 and launched an attack in retaliation for the suicide attack on February 14, 2019 [note: see KI in LIB India on February 20, 2019] a training camp of the Islamist group Jaish-e-Mohammad outside the city of Balakot (Balakot region, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, Pakistan). This is outside the contested region of Kashmir (SZ February 26, 2019; see FAZ February 26, 2019b, WP February 26, 2019). India is convinced that the suicide attack on February 14 was planned and supported from Pakistan (NZZ February 26, 2019).
The information on the effects of the bombing varies: While Indian authorities report that almost 200 (CNN News 18 26.2.2019) terrorists, trainers, commanders and jihadists were killed and the camp completely destroyed, the Pakistani military confirms the air strike (DW February 26, 2019), however, announces that the Indian planes had hastily disposed of their bomb load near Balakot in order to immediately escape the ascending Pakistani fighter jets. According to Pakistani information, there is neither a large number of victims (Dawn 02.26.2019; see FAZ 02.26.2019a), nor would infrastructure have been hit (DW 26.2.2019).
Observers were skeptical that this military strike could actually have hit a large number of terrorists in one place. Residents of the village of Balakot told the Reuters news agency that they were startled by loud explosions in the early morning. They said that only one person was injured and no one was killed. They also stated that there had indeed been a terror camp in the area in the past. However, this has now been converted into a Koran school (FAZ 26.2.2019b).
The Pakistani armed forces reportedly shot down two Indian fighter planes over Pakistan on February 27, 2019 and confirmed the arrest of a pilot. A spokesman for the Indian government confirms the shooting down of a MiG-21 (standard February 27, 2019). The Indian pilot was handed over to the Indian authorities on March 1st, 2019 at the Wagah border crossing. The Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan described the release as a "gesture of peace" (March 1st, 2019).
Pakistan closed its airspace completely on February 27, 2019 (Flightradar24 February 27, 2019) and reopened its airspace on March 1, 2019 for flights to / from Karachi, Islamabad, Peschawar and Quetta (also Lahore on March 2) (Flightradar24 February 27, 1/3 / 2.3.2019; see AAN 1.3.2019). The entire airspace was - with restrictions - on March 4th. released (Dawn 6.3.2019; see Dawn 4.3.2019b).
On March 2nd, 2019 it was reported that at least seven people had been killed and ten others injured in firefights in the Kashmiri border area. According to Indian media reports, a 24-year-old woman and her two children were killed by artillery fire and eight other people were injured in the Indian part of the conflict region. According to the Pakistani security forces, a boy and another civilian and two soldiers were killed and two other people were injured in the Pakistani part of Kashmir. The armies of the enemy neighbors had repeatedly fired at various points across the de facto border between the parts of Kashmir controlled by Pakistan and India since March 1, 2019 (Presse March 2, 2019).On March 3rd, 2019 both sides reported that the situation along the "Line of Control" was relatively calm again (Reuters March 3rd, 2019)
The Pakistani Minister of Information confirmed on March 3, 2019 that decisive action against the extremist and militant organizations Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Jamaatud Dawa (JuD) with their charity wing Falah-i-Insaniat Foundation (FIF) was imminent. This approach would be in accordance with the National Action Plan (NAP). The decision to do so was long before the attack on Indian security forces on February 14th. fallen and only now been released. The decision was not made under pressure from India (Dawn 4.3.2019a).
KI on February 20, 2019, suicide attack on Indian security forces Awantipora / Pulwama district / Kashmir on February 14, 2019, firefight in Pinglan / Pulwama district / Kashmir on February 18, 2019 (relevant to Section 3.1./ regional problem zone Jammu and Kashmir).
At least 44 people were killed in a suicide attack (TOI February 15, 2019) on Indian security forces in the Goripora area near Awantipora in the Pulwama district of Kashmir. Dozen were injured (IT February 15, 2019).
As reported by the police, an off-road vehicle loaded with around 350 kilograms of explosives exploded on a highway in the Pulwama district (DS 14.2.2019). The target of the attack was a convoy of 78 buses of the paramilitary police force Central Police Reserve Force (CRPF), which was on the strictly guarded road between the cities of Jammu and the capital of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, Srinagar (DW 14.2.2019). The Pakistani terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) claimed the attack for itself (ANI February 14, 2019).
The group, which originated in Pakistan, has areas of retreat there and uses Kashmir as an arena for their acts of violence. India assumes that the terrorists are supported by circles within the Pakistani military (SZ February 15, 2019).
According to local officials, the bombing was the worst attack in the embattled region in three decades (TNYT 02/14/2019).
India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi spoke of a "vile attack" on Twitter, describing the dead as "martyrs" and further announcing that "the sacrifices made by our courageous security forces will not be in vain. "(DS 14.2.2019). While Pakistan rejects allegations behind the suicide attack, the Indian government calls on Pakistan to take action against the group (DS February 15, 2019).
In an action by the Indian security forces in connection with the bomb attack, five members of the Indian security forces, three militants and one civilian were killed in a firefight between militants and the Indian army in Pinglan in the Pulwama district on February 18, 2019. At least seven security guards were injured. According to the police, the killed militants were members of the JeM who were involved in the attack on February 14, 2019 in nearby Awantipora (TIT February 18, 2019).
Following the announcement by Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan that he would investigate India's allegations and his warning that Pakistan would take retaliatory measures against any Indian military action (TNYT 02/19/2019), India reacted violently by calling Islamabad “the nerve center of terrorism” "(TOI February 19, 2019). Tensions between India and Pakistan have intensified; both countries have called their ambassadors back for consultations (TNYT February 19, 2019).
According to its own statements, India responded in September 2016 to an attack on a military base in Kashmir, in which 19 Indian soldiers were killed, with a "surgical blow" in the Pakistani part of Kashmir. At that time, too, India blamed JeM for the attack (DS 14.2.2019).
The situation on site will continue to be monitored and, if necessary, additional brief information will be provided.
With over 1.3 billion people and a multi-religious and multi-ethnic society, India is the most populous democracy in the world (CIA Factbook January 23, 2019; see AA September 18, 2018). In the Indian federal system, the central government has significantly greater powers than the state governments. India has 29 states and six union territories (AA 11.2018a). In accordance with the constitution, the states and union territories have a high degree of autonomy and have primary responsibility for law and order (USDOS April 20, 2018). The capital New Delhi has a special legal status (AA 11.2018a).
The separation of powers between parliament and government corresponds to the British model (AA September 18, 2018), the principle of the separation of powers between the legislature, executive and judiciary is enforced (AA 11.2018a). The independence of the judiciary, which has a three-tier instance, is constitutionally guaranteed (AA September 18, 2018). The Supreme Court in New Delhi is at the head of the judiciary and is followed by the High Courts at state level (GIZ 3.2018a). Freedom of the press is guaranteed by the constitution, but is subject to repeated challenges (AA 9.2018a). India also has a vibrant civil society (AA 11.2018a).
India is a parliamentary democracy and has a multi-party system and a bicameral parliament (USDOS April 20, 2018). In addition, there are parliaments at the state level (AA September 18, 2018).
The President is the head of state and is elected by an electoral committee, while the Prime Minister is the head of government (USDOS April 20, 2018). The office of president primarily entails representative tasks, but in the event of a crisis the president has far-reaching powers. President Ram Nath Kovind has been Indian head of state since July 2017 (AA 11.2018a). However, the most important office within the executive is held by the Prime Minister (GIZ 3.2018a).
Elections to the House of Commons take place every five years according to simple majority voting ("first-past-the-post"), most recently in April / May 2014 with almost 830 million eligible voters (AA September 18, 2018). Three major party alliances faced each other: The United Progressive Alliance (UPA) led by the Congress Party, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP - Indian People's Party) and the so-called Third Front, which consists of eleven regional - and left-wing parties as well as the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), which emerged from part of the India Against Corruption movement (GIZ 3.2018a; see FAZ 16.5.2014). Apart from minor disruptions, the elections were correct and free (AA September 18, 2018). As the clear winner with 336 of 543 seats, the party alliance "National Democratic Alliance" (NDA) with the "Bharatiya Janata Party" (BJP) as the strongest party (282 seats) replaced the Congress Party in government (AA September 18, 2018) . The BJP not only won an absolute majority, it also left the previously ruling Indian National Congress (INC) far behind. The INC only had 46 seats and suffered the worst defeat since the founding of the state in 1947. How things will go with the INC with or without the Gandhi family remains to be seen. The wins in the elections in Punjab, Goa and Manipur as well as the relatively good performance in Gujarat are certainly a glimmer of hope that the days of the Congress party are not over yet (GIZ 13.2018a). The Anti-Corruption Party (AAP), which won 28 out of 70 seats in the 2013 election in Delhi, only won four seats nationwide in 2014 (GIZ 3.2018; see FAZ 16.5.2014). The BJP's top candidate, the previous Prime Minister of Gujarat, Narendra Modi, was elected Prime Minister and has since headed a 26-member cabinet (with an additional 37 ministers of state) (AA September 18, 2018).
In India there will be re-election between April and May 2019. However, the exact schedule is still unclear. In the polls, the Hindu nationalist Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his BJP are ahead (DS 1.1.2019).
The new government, which has been in office since 2014, not only wants to continue the market economy course, but also intensify it by removing bureaucratic obstacles and reducing protectionism. Foreign investors should become more active (GIZ 3.2018b).
India pursues an active foreign policy under Prime Minister Modi. The core foreign policy approach of "strategic autonomy" is increasingly being supplemented by a policy of "multiple partnerships". The most important goal of Indian foreign policy is the creation of a peaceful and stable global environment for the country's economic development and, as an up-and-coming creative power, the increasing responsible participation in shaping the rule-based international order (AA 11.2018b). A permanent seat on the UN Security Council remains a strategic goal (GIZ 3.2018a). At the same time, India is striving for stronger regional ties with its neighbors, with alternative concepts to the one-sidedly sino-centric "New Silk Road" playing an important role. In the South Asia region, India is also increasingly relying on the regional organization BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation). India is a dialogue partner of the Southeast Asian community and a member of the "Regional Forum" (ARF). India is also taking part in the East Asia Summit and, since 2007, in the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) accepted India and Pakistan as full members in 2017. The will of the BRICS group of states (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) recently appeared to have decreased (AA 11.2018b).
In the decades since independence, phases of dialogue and tensions, including armed conflict, have repeatedly followed one another in relations with our neighbors, Pakistan, who are also nuclear armed. The biggest obstacle to improving relations continues to be the cashmere problem (AA 11.2018b).
India achieved a breakthrough with the nuclear agreement with the USA. Although it refuses to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty to this day, the agreement means access to nuclear technology. India's relationship with China has also developed positively. The controversial border issues have not yet been resolved, but confidence-building measures have been agreed so that at least this issue no longer provokes a conflict. There is also interest in a further increase in bilateral trade, which has increased more than tenfold within a decade (GIZ 3.2018a).
Relations with Bangladesh are of a special nature, as the two countries share a border that is over 4,000 km long. India controls the upper reaches of the most important rivers in Bangladesh and was historically instrumental in the formation of Bangladesh during its war of independence. Difficult issues such as transit, border lines, unregulated border crossings and migration, water distribution and smuggling are discussed in regular government talks. The country's relations with the EU are particularly important from an economic point of view. The EU is India's largest trade and investment partner. In fact, trade in goods in both directions has steadily expanded (GIZ 3.2018a).
India is rich in tensions across ethnic groups, religions, castes and also life perspectives, which often erupt in local riots (GIZ 3.2018a). Terrorist attacks in previous years (December 2010 in Varanasi, July 2011 in Mumbai, September 2011 in New Delhi and Agra, April 2013 in Bangalore, May 2014 in Chennai and December 2014 in Bangalore) and in particular the attacks in Mumbai in November 2008 pressured the government. Only a few of the attacks in recent years have been completely cleared up and the reform projects announced in response to these incidents to improve the Indian security architecture have not been implemented consistently (AA April 24, 2015). But there were also terrorist attacks with an Islamist background in the rest of the country. In March 2017, an "Islamic State" (IS) cell in the capital of the state of Madhya Pradesh placed a bomb on a passenger train. According to the police, the terror cell is also said to have planned an attack on a rally by Prime Minister Modi (BPB 12.12.2017).
The tensions in the north-east of the country continue, as does the dispute with the Naxalites (GIZ 3.2018a). The state monopoly on the use of force is being called into question in some areas by the activities of the "Naxalites" (AA September 18, 2018).
The South Asia Terrorism Portal recorded a total of 898 fatalities from terrorism-related violence in 2016. In 2017 803 people were killed by terrorist violence and in 2018 935 people were killed by acts of terrorism. By January 13, 2019, 12 deaths were registered as a result of the use of terrorist violence [Note: the figures quoted include civilians, security forces and terrorists] (SATP January 13, 2019).
Conflict regions are Jammu and Kashmir, the northeastern regions and the Maoist belt. Attacks by Maoist rebels on security forces and infrastructure continued in Jharkhand and Bihar. In Punjab, violent opponents of the government repeatedly led to assassinations and bomb attacks. In addition to the Islamist terrorists, the Naxalites (Maoist underground fighters) contribute to the destabilization of the country. From Chattisgarh they fight in many union states (from Bihar in the north to Andrah Pradesh in the south) with armed force against state institutions. In the north-east of the country, numerous separatist groups (United Liberation Front Assom, National Liberation Front Tripura, National Socialist Council Nagaland, Manipur People's Liberation Front etc.) are fighting against state power and demanding either independence or more autonomy. Hindu radicalism, which is directed against minorities such as Muslims and Christians, is seldom officially classified in the terror category, but rather referred to as "communal violence" (ÖB 12.2018).
The government acts with great severity and consistency against militant groups, who mostly advocate the independence of certain regions and / or adhere to radical views. If such groups renounce violence, negotiations about their demands are usually possible. Nonviolent independence groups are free to be politically active (AA September 18, 2018).
Pakistan and India
Pakistan neither recognizes the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to the Indian Union in 1947 nor the de facto division of the region between the two states since the first war in the same year. India, on the other hand, takes the position that Jammu and Kashmir as a whole are not part of India (AA 11.2018b). Since 1947 there have been three wars due to the disputed Kashmir area (BBC January 23, 2018).
After the peaceful struggle for independence against British colonial rule, the bloody division of British India, which was accompanied by mass exodus, severe outbreaks of violence and pogroms, showed how difficult it will be to keep the ethnically, religiously, linguistically and socio-economically extremely heterogeneous society together in a nation-state. The inter-religious violence continued even after the partition between India and Pakistan (BPB 12.12.2017).
India accuses Pakistan of at least tolerating, if not promoting, infiltration of terrorists into Indian territory. Major terrorist attacks in India in 2001 and 2008 and a terrorist attack on a military base in the Indian part of Kashmir in September 2016 had significantly exacerbated tensions in bilateral relations. According to a government statement, India responded to the attack, in which 18 Indian soldiers were killed, with a limited military operation ("surgical strike") in the Pakistani-controlled part of Kashmir, which, according to Indian information, was directed against an impending terrorist infiltration. There are repeated exchanges of fire between Indian and Pakistani troops at the armistice line in Kashmir. India sees Pakistan as responsible for the terrorist threats on its northwestern border and is increasing the pressure on its neighbors to achieve effective Pakistani measures against terrorism (AA 11.2018b).
The dialogue process between the two sides, which gave rise to hope from 2014-2015, came to a standstill in 2016. Relationships are currently stable at a very low level (AA 11.2018b).
Violent left-wing extremist groups (so-called "Naxalites" or "Maoist guerrillas") continue to represent a major domestic political challenge for the Indian government
operate in large parts of eastern core India, especially in rural areas (AA September 18, 2018).
With the amalgamation of different militant groups, the conflict intensified and militarized again in 1998, which peaked between 2005 and 2009. As a result, the Indian central government decided on a national security and development policy action plan to contain the violence. Although the Naxalites were pushed back in many places and weakened considerably by the arrest, killing or surrender of leading cadres, the causes of the conflict have so far not been adequately addressed (BPB 12/12/2017).
The phenomenon of Maoist (Naxalitic) terror, which has existed for decades, has so far only been countered with little success with police measures at the local level (ÖB 10.2017). The Naxalites regularly carry out attacks on security forces, political opponents and the public infrastructure (BPB 12.12.2017; cf. ÖB 10.2017). They operate in large parts of eastern central India, especially in rural areas. In Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal, Odisha and Andhra Pradesh, the Naxalites have succeeded in establishing their own rulership structures in numerous districts (AA September 18, 2018). The Maoist Naxalites strive for the forcible establishment of a communist social order. Their guerrilla strategy aims to control the rural population and destroy the central institutions of the state (BPB 12.12.2017).
The Naxalites pursue a double strategy: on the one hand there is social commitment, job creation and the defense of the poor and the weak, on the other hand brutal violence, guerrilla actions, intimidation and blackmail against real and supposed, including civilian "opponents". Murder squads against police units are not uncommon. However, human rights violations by the security forces in the Naxalite areas have also been documented. The civilian population finds itself between the fronts (AA September 18, 2018).
The Indian Police Service is not a direct law enforcement or law enforcement agency (BICC 12.2018) and is subordinate to the states (AA 18.9.2018). Rather, it acts as a training and recruiting agency for police officers in the states. With regard to the federal structures, the police are organized on a decentralized basis in the individual states. However, given a national police law, numerous national criminal laws and the central recruiting office for executives, the individual units have a number of things in common. In general, the police are entrusted with prosecuting, preventing and combating crime, and maintaining public order, while at the same time exercising partial control over the various secret services. Within the police there is a Criminal Investigation Department (CID), in which a special unit (Special Branch) is integrated. While the former is entrusted with national and interstate crimes, the task of the special unit is to gather information and monitor all subversive elements and persons. In almost every state, special police units have been set up to deal with women and children. Most of the law enforcement agencies are controlled by the Ministry of Home Affairs (BICC 12.2018).
In addition to structural deficits, a lack of trust in the reliability of the police arises from frequent reports of human rights violations such as torture, extrajudicial killings and threats that were allegedly perpetrated by the police (BICC 12.2018). The police remain overworked, underpaid and exposed to political pressure, leading to corruption in some cases (USDOS 4/20/2018). Police reforms were delayed again in 2017 (HRW January 18, 2018).
The effectiveness of law enforcement and security forces varies widely across the country. While there are cases of police officers / officials who act with impunity at all levels, there have also been cases in which security officers were held accountable for their illegal actions (USDOS April 20, 2018).
The Indian military is subordinate to civil administration and has shown little interest in a political role in the past. The supreme command is incumbent on the President. According to their self-image, the army is the "protector of the nation", but only in a military sense (BICC 12.2018). The military can be deployed in Germany if this is necessary to maintain internal security (AA September 18, 2018; cf. BICC 12.2018). Paramilitary units are used as part of the armed forces, especially in internal conflicts, for example in Jammu and Kashmir as well as in the northeastern states. These missions often lead to significant human rights violations (BICC 12.2018).
The Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) to maintain "law and order" is used as the legal basis for the deployment of armed forces - especially land forces - in unrest areas and against terrorists (USDOS April 20, 2018). The AFSPA gives the armed forces extensive powers to use lethal force, make arrests without a warrant, and search without a warrant. In their actions, those involved in the armed forces enjoy broad immunity from prosecution. The AFSPA comes into play after state governments declare their states or only parts of them to be "unrest areas" on the basis of the Disturbed Areas Act. The controversial Special Authorization Act for the Armed Forces (AFSPA) was repealed on April 23, 2018 for the state of Meghalaya after 27 years and limited to 8 police districts in the state of Arunachal Pradesh. It remains in force unchanged in the following unrest areas: Assam, and Nagaland as well as in parts of Manipur. There is a separate version for Jammu and Kashmir (AA September 18, 2018).
The Indian paramilitary units deployed in the central Indian states affected by left-wing extremist groups (so-called Naxalites) are largely subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior (AA September 18, 2018). These include in particular the National Security Guard (NSG), a special force for personal protection made up of members of the army and the police, also known as the "Black Cat", the Rashtriya Rifles, a special force for protecting traffic and communication links in the event of civil unrest to fight armed rebellions, the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) - the Federal Reserve Police, a militarily equipped police force for special operations - the Border Security Force (BSF - Federal Border Guard) as the largest and best-equipped militia to protect the borders with Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. But it is also used to maintain internal order in other parts of the country. Furthermore, the Assam Rifles - responsible for border defense in the northeast - the Indo-Tibetan Border Force (ITBP) as the Indo-Tibetan border police as well as the coast guard, the Railway Protective Force to protect the national railways and the Central Industrial Security Force to protect the state-owned companies (ÖB 12.2018). Particularly in unrest areas, the security forces have extensive powers to combat secessionist and terrorist groups, which are often used excessively (AA September 18, 2018).
The Special Frontier Force is subordinate to the Prime Minister's Office. The so-called border special forces are an elite unit that is deployed on sensitive sections in the border area with China. They operate within the framework of the secret services, the so-called Intelligence Bureau and the Research and Analysis Wing (War Heros of India, September 16, 2018).
The law also allows authorities to detain detainees without charge for up to 180 days (including the 30 days in police custody). The Prevention of Unlawful Activities Act (UAPA) gives authorities the ability to detain people in cases of rioting or terrorism (USDOS April 20, 2018).
NGOs and human rights activists
India's civil society is polyphonic; There is an almost unmanageable number of non-governmental organizations (official estimates are over 3 million), including many domestic and foreign human rights organizations (AA September 18, 2018) that advocate social justice, sustainable development and human rights (USDOS April 20, 2018) . In principle, they can operate freely (AA September 18, 2018) and usually without government restrictions, investigate cases of human rights violations and publish the results (USDOS April 20, 2018). The website NGOsIndia.com contains extensive further information about the numerous human rights organizations active in various areas and regions in India (NGOsIndia.com undated).
There are no systematic state obstacles or reprisals against human rights defenders (AA September 18, 2018), but in some cases there are restrictions (USDOS April 20, 2018). It is not uncommon for NGOs to be subtle harassment by the authorities (delay or refusal of permits, especially for the receipt of foreign funds, frequent billing and financial reviews, slow processing or refusal to issue visas for foreign personnel, travel bans) and also threats, for example by the army or the police, suspended (AA September 18, 2018; see FH January 27, 2018). Individual human rights defenders, especially in the area of social and economic rights, and journalists feel that their work is restricted by local authorities / police. Occasionally, these are also victims of violence (AA September 18, 2018; cf. FH January 27, 2018). Human rights monitors in Jammu and Kashmir were able to document human rights violations (USDOS April 20, 2018), but there are repeated attempts to intimidate journalists and human rights defenders (including arrests, license revocation), particularly in the conflict-affected state of Jammu and Kashmir and in northeast India, which is threatened by separatist groups to physical attacks. In these areas, due to the special legal framework, there is often impunity for human rights violations (AA September 18, 2018).
The government typically met with domestic NGOs, responded to their inquiries, and took action in response to their reports and recommendations. The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and its committees work with numerous NGOs and their representatives (USDOS April 20, 2018).
The law grants nationwide freedom of movement, international travel, migration and repatriation, and the government generally respects these rights (USDOS 4/20/2018). The state monopoly on the use of force is being called into question in some areas by the activities of the "Naxalites". Apart from that, freedom of movement within the country is guaranteed (AA September 18, 2018).
The government relaxed restrictions on foreign travelers regarding travel to Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Mizoram, Manipur and parts of Jammu and Kashmir, except for foreigners from Pakistan, China and Burma. The Ministry of the Interior and state governments require citizens to obtain special permits prior to travel to travel to certain restricted regions or restricted zones (USDOS April 20, 2018).
There is no state reporting or registration system, so a large part of the population does not have an identity card. This favors the establishment in another part of the country in case of persecution. Even with ongoing criminal prosecution, it is not uncommon for a person to live undisturbed in rural districts in another part of the country without the person having to hide their identity (AA September 18, 2018).
In the big cities, however, the police are better staffed and better equipped, so that the possibility of being tracked down is greater there. Well-known personalities ("high profile" people) cannot avoid persecution by moving to another part of the country, but less well-known people ("low profile" people) can (ÖB 12.2018).
There is still no national registration or citizenship register in India. The government has been pursuing a national project for the registration of citizens for a number of years, and this will involve the issue of identity cards ("Aadhar Card"). Despite some preparatory work, the realization of this project is still a long way off. There is no reporting system in India (ÖB 12.2018; see AA September 18, 2018).
Basic service and economy
In India, around a quarter of the population lives below the United Nations' estimated subsistence level. Unless extraordinary natural disasters occur, a food supply that ensures survival is largely guaranteed, even for the lowest strata of the population. There are no state reception facilities for returnees, there is no social assistance, the returnees depend on the support of their own family or of acquaintances (ÖB 12.2018).
Economic growth was 7.1 percent in the 2016/2017 financial year and 6.75 percent in 2017/18, with an upward trend again. India is still one of the fastest growing economies in the world (AA 11.2018a).
According to estimates by the ILO, the employment rate in 2016 was 55.6 percent. The majority of people work in the private sector. There are still large differences in the gender distribution of the labor market. India has the second largest workforce in the world with 478.3 million people (2012). Every year, 12.8 million workers are added. In 2015 the unemployment rate was 3.4 percent (according to ILO 2016) (BAMF September 3, 2018).
According to estimates, only around 10 percent of all employees are in a contractually regulated employment relationship. The remaining 90 percent are assigned to the so-called "informal sector" - they are not insured against illness or accidents at work, nor are they entitled to social benefits or retirement benefits (AA 11.2018a). The vast majority of the Indian population lives in rural-farming structures and remains economically disadvantaged. The share of agriculture in Indian economic output has been falling continuously for years and is only around 16.4 percent (2017/18) of the overall economy, although almost 50 percent of the Indian workforce is active in this area (AA 11.2018a).
The government has set up around 1,000 Employment Exchanges across the country to facilitate the recruitment of suitable candidates. Job seekers register themselves with the employment agencies and are informed as soon as a suitable position is available (BAMF 3.9.2018; see PIB 23.7.2018). The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) runs until 2019. The aim of the current program is to improve rural infrastructure, increase land and water resources, and help the rural poor To offer a livelihood: Every household whose adult members are willing to do manual work that does not require any special qualifications is guaranteed at least 100 days of wage labor per budget year (SNRD 26.3.2018) Some states in India give job seekers financial support for a period of three years. For more information, please contact the local recruitment agency. They also offer advice, in which they provide information (BAMF 3.9.2018).
India faces enormous challenges in poverty reduction and in education and infrastructure development. The average annual per capita income is around
$ 1,970. India ranks 130th out of 188 countries on the UNDP Human Development Index (as of September 2016). While it is home to the most millionaires and billionaires in the world, India is well below the averages of sub-Saharan Africa on many social indicators. At the same time, hundreds of millions of people in India have escaped poverty over the past two decades (AA 11.2018a).
The government operates a variety of housing finance programs. However, these are mostly aimed at people below the poverty line. Furthermore, the governments offer a variety of social benefits, which are aimed at underprivileged groups such as the population below the poverty line. These programs are basically implemented by the local administrations (Panchayat) (BAMF 3.9.2018).
Employee pension insurance is compulsory and linked to work. The National Social Assistance Program only covers the population below the poverty line or the physically disadvantaged. The state pension system National Pension System (NPS) is a voluntary, contribution-based system, which enables the participants to build systematic reserves during their working life (BAMF 3.9.2018).
55.3 percent of the population (642.4 million) live in multi-dimensional poverty (HDI 2016). Unless there are extraordinary natural disasters, however, a sufficient food supply for survival is fundamentally ensured even for the weakest parts of the population. There are no state reception facilities for returnees, social assistance or any other social network. Returnees depend on the support of family or friends.Temporary emergencies can be compensated for by feeding the poor in the temple, especially the Sikh temples, which also provide accommodation for smaller services (AA September 18, 2018).
In September 2018, the Supreme Court confirmed the constitutionality of the Aadhaar biometric identification project (HRW January 17, 2019). As part of a poverty reduction initiative, millions of Indian citizens have been issued an Aadhaar ID number since 2010. The system was originally introduced to counteract tax fraud. In the following years, however, the scope was expanded significantly: In some Indian states, pensions, grants and food distribution for poor people are handled by means of Aadhaar (ORF September 27, 2018). For the majority of the population, Aadhaar is the only access to a state-recognized ID card. Those who registered with Aadhaar were given a unique twelve-digit identification number after they had submitted their fingerprints and retinal scans (BBC 9/26/2018).
Human rights groups express concern that registration conditions for Aadhaar prevent poor and marginalized people from receiving essential, constitutionally guaranteed services such as food and health care (HRW 18/01/2018).
The mere fact that a person has applied for asylum does not lead to adverse consequences after deportation. Recently, returned rejected Indian asylum seekers have not been reported to have been disadvantaged after their return. However, persons wanted by the police must expect arrest and handover to the security authorities upon entry (AA September 18, 2018).
2. Evidence assessment:
The findings on the person of the complainant result from the complainant's credible submissions in this regard - also in the previous proceedings - especially since there are no indications that these circumstances do not correspond to the facts.
The complainant's statements clearly show that there are no newly created facts, especially since this is clearly evident from his statements at the respective interrogations. The fact that the complainant speaks little German, does not do any legal work, and there are no other indications of advanced integration, results from the clear statements in this regard during his interrogations in the first instance proceedings, the complaint allegation made in contrast to an excellent integration in the federal territory In view of the clear statements made in the interrogations in this regard, they are not followed, especially since this complaint allegation has not been substantiated in any way. Excellent integration fails due to the complainant's admitted poor knowledge of German. Health impairments or incapacity for work did not emerge in the ongoing proceedings.
The findings on the general situation result from the sources already cited by the BFA in the contested decision, the harmlessness of which it has already pointed out in an appropriate manner. After the allegation in the course of the questioning at the BFA and in the complaint, the complainant did not contest the general findings in a substantiated manner. There are also no indications that the general situation has changed in the meantime in a way that would have to be observed ex officio.
3. Legal assessment:
According to § 6 BVwGG, the Federal Administrative Court decides by single judges, unless the decision by senates is provided for in federal or state laws. This means that the individual judge has jurisdiction.
The procedure of the administrative courts with the exception of the Federal Finance Court is regulated by the VwGVG, Federal Law Gazette I 2013/33 as amended by Federal Law Gazette I 2013/122 (§ 1 leg.cit.). Pursuant to Section 58 (2) VwGVG, contrary provisions that were already announced at the time this federal act came into force remain in force.
According to § 17 VwGVG, unless otherwise specified in this federal act, the provisions of the AVG are the provisions of the AVG with the exception of §§ 1 to 5 and Part IV, the provisions on the procedure for complaints pursuant to Art. 130 para. 1 B-VG of the Federal Tax Code - BAO, Federal Law Gazette No. 194/1961, the Agricultural Procedure Act - AgrVG, Federal Law Gazette No. 173/1950, and the Service Law Procedure Act 1984 - DVG, Federal Law Gazette No. 29/1984, and also those procedural provisions in federal or state laws that the authority applied or should have applied in the proceedings preceding the proceedings before the administrative court.
Section 1 BFA-VG, Federal Law Gazette I 2012/87 as amended by Federal Law Gazette I 2013/144, states that this federal law contains general procedural provisions that apply to all foreigners in proceedings before the Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum, before representative authorities or in a corresponding complaint procedure apply to the Federal Administrative Court. Further procedural provisions in the Asylum Act and the FPG remain unaffected.
Section 16 (6) and Section 18 (7) BFA-VG stipulate that sections 13 (2 to 5) and 22 VwGVG do not apply to preliminary complaint proceedings and complaint proceedings.
According to § 9 Paragraph 2 FPG, Federal Law Gazette I No. 100/2005 as amended, and § 7 Paragraph 1 Z 1 BFA-VG, the Federal Administrative Court decides on complaints against decisions (notices) of the BFA. The Federal Administrative Court is therefore responsible for the decision.
According to Section 28 (1) VwGVG, the administrative court has to settle the legal case by decision, provided that the complaint is not rejected or the proceedings are discontinued. In accordance with Section 31 (1) VwGVG, the decisions and orders are made by resolution, unless a finding is to be made.
Regarding ruling points I. and II. Of the contested decision
Pursuant to Section 68 (1) AVG, parties who, in addition to the cases under Sections 69 and 71, request the amendment of a decision that is not or no longer subject to the appeal if the authority does not find cause for an order in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 4 are to be submitted to be dismissed because of a decided matter.
The "matter" of the appeal process is usually the matter that formed the content of the verdict of the decision of the lower instance, insofar as it was contested (VwSlg 7548A / 1969, VfSlg 7240/1973, VwGH of October 8, 1996, 94/04/0248; Walter -Thienel, Verwaltungsverfahren2, 1265 mwH).
In the present case, the matter of the appeal procedure is therefore the question of the legality of the rejection of the (second) asylum application because of a decided matter. The appellate authority may only decide on the question of whether the rejection (because of a decided matter) by the lower court was justified and accordingly has either - in the case of a decided matter - to dismiss the appeal or - in the case of an incorrect view - the one contested To remedy the decision without substitution with the consequence that the first instance authority, bound by the opinion of the appellate authority, may in any case not again reject the application because of a decided matter. The appellate authority is not allowed to make a merit decision on the application itself (VwSlg 2066A / 1951, VwGH of May 30, 1995, 93/08/0207; Walter-Thienel, Verwaltungsverfahren2, 1433 mwH).
It is up to the party that seeks a new decision on the matter in a legally binding matter to justify this request (VwGH 9/8/1977, 2609/76). The examination of the admissibility of a breach of the legal force due to changed circumstances may only be carried out on the basis of those reasons which are asserted by the party in the first instance to justify its request for a new decision (VwGH 23.5.1995, 94/04/0081).
The matter has been decided if neither the legal situation nor the essential facts have changed compared to the previous decision (VwGH 03/21/1985, 83/06/0023, and others). The matter is identical even if the authority has decided the legal question in the proceedings that have already been legally concluded on the basis of an inadequate investigative procedure or an incomplete or incorrect legal assessment (VwGH 04/08/1992, 88/12/0169).
The concept of identity of the thing must first and foremost be judged from a legal point of view. This means that the alleged changed circumstances must be relevant to the decision (VwGH of January 30, 1995, 94/10/0162 etc.). A new decision on the matter does not conflict with the legal force of an earlier decision on the same matter in accordance with Section 68 (1) AVG only if there has been a change in the circumstances decisive for the decision (VwGH 07.12.1988, 86/01/0164) . The answer to the question of whether the situation that was relevant after the earlier decision has changed in such a way that the issue of a new decision is possible requires that the existing facts are measured against the legal view on which this decision is based and its normative background using the same method with which it would have to be measured against the norm itself in the event of a new factual decision (Hauer / Leukauf, Handbuch des Österreichisches Verwaltungsvergangs, fifth edition, E 19 b to § 68 AVG).
The BFA correctly came to the conclusion that there are no credible new facts. As is clear from the complainant's statements, there are no possibly relevant newly arisen facts, which is why the BFA correctly assumed that there was a decided matter that forbids making a merit decision on the application for international protection again.
A relevant change in the facts of the case with regard to the general situation, according to which every Indian would be endangered in his home country in the event of a return, cannot be identified from the findings of the Federal Office either, which is why nothing can be gained from this for the complainant.
The complainant was unable to show that, in contrast to the situation when the decision of the Asylum Court of December 19, 2012 was issued, the complainant who was able to work would not be able to provide for the most essential living costs. At best, difficult living conditions are not sufficient to grant protection within the meaning of Section 8 AsylG.
On point III. to VI. of the contested decision:
According to Section 10, Paragraph 1, Item 3 of the Asylum Act 2005, a decision under this federal law must be combined with a return decision or an order to move abroad in accordance with Chapter 8 of the FPG, if the application for international protection is made both with regard to the granting of asylum status and the granting of the status of beneficiary of subsidiary protection is also rejected and a residence permit is not issued ex officio in accordance with Section 57 AsylG 2005 and there is no case under Sections 8 (3a) or 9 (2) AsylG 2005.
According to Section 57 (1) AsylG 2005, third-country nationals staying in the federal territory are to be granted a "special protection residence permit" ex officio or upon justified application:
1. if the stay of the third-country national in the federal territory has been tolerated for at least one year in accordance with Section 46a Paragraph 1 No. 1 or Paragraph 1a FPG and the conditions for this continue to exist, unless the third-country national poses a risk to the general public or to the security of the Republic of Austria or was convicted by a domestic court of a crime (Section 17 StGB). A conviction by a domestic court is equivalent to a conviction by a foreign court that meets the requirements of Section 73 of the Criminal Code,
2. to ensure the prosecution of judicial criminal acts or to assert and enforce civil law claims in connection with such criminal acts, in particular against witnesses or victims of human trafficking or cross-border prostitution trafficking or
3. if the third-country national who is not lawfully resident or not settled in the federal territory has been the victim of violence, a temporary injunction according to §§ 382b or 382e EO, RGBl. No. 79/1896, was issued or could have been issued and the third-country national demonstrates credibly that the issue of the "special protection residence permit" is necessary to protect against further violence.
The complainant has been in Germany since 2012 and his stay is not tolerated. He is neither a witness nor a victim of criminal acts, nor is he a victim of violence. The prerequisites for the official issue of a residence title in accordance with Section 57 AsylG 2005 are therefore not met, although this was not even alleged in the proceedings or in the complaint.
In the present proceedings, the application for international protection with regard to the status of beneficiary of subsidiary protection was not rejected in accordance with Section 8 (3a) AsylG 2005 and no withdrawal was made in accordance with Section 9 (2) AsylG 2005, as can be seen from the course of the procedure .
Pursuant to Section 52 (2) FPG, the Federal Office must issue a return decision against a third-country national under a (Section 10 AsylG 2005) if the applicant's application for international protection is concerned both with regard to the granting of the status of asylum seeker and the granting of subsidiary status The person entitled to protection is rejected and there is no case of §§ 8 Paragraph 3a or 9 Paragraph 2 AsylG 2005 and he has no right of residence under other federal laws. This does not apply to beneficiary third-country nationals.
As a national of India, the complainant is not a beneficiary third-country national and has no right of residence under other federal laws.
Section 9 (1) to (3) BFA-VG reads:
(1) If a return decision according to § 52 FPG, an order to move abroad according to § 61 FPG, an expulsion according to § 66 FPG or a residence ban according to § 67 FPG encroaches on the foreigner's private or family life, the decision is issued permissible if this is urgently required in order to achieve the objectives named in Art. 8 Para. 2 ECHR.
(2) When assessing private and family life within the meaning of Art. 8 ECHR, the following must be taken into account in particular:
1. the type and duration of the previous stay and the question of whether the previous stay of the alien was illegal,
2. the actual existence of family life,
3. the need to protect private life,
4. the degree of integration,
5. the ties to the foreigner's home country,
6. the integrity of the criminal justice system,
7. Violations of public order, in particular in the area of asylum, aliens police and immigration law,
8. the question of whether the stranger's private and family life came into being at a time when those involved were aware of their uncertain residence status,
9. The question of whether the length of the alien's previous stay in the authorities is justified.
(3) The admissibility of the return decision according to § 52 FPG is in any case justified, in particular with regard to whether it is permanently inadmissible according to Paragraph 1. The inadmissibility of a return decision according to § 52 FPG is only permanent if the otherwise threatened violation of private and family life is based on circumstances that are by their nature not merely temporary. This is especially the case if the return decision according to § 52 FPG is based solely on private and family life with regard to Austrian citizens or persons who have a right of residence under Union law or an unlimited right of settlement (§§ 45 and 48 or §§ 51 ff Settlement and Residence Act (NAG), Federal Law Gazette I No. 100/2005) would be inadmissible.
The term "family life" in Art. 8 ECHR includes not only the nuclear family of parents and (minor) children and spouses, but also more distant family relationships, provided that these relationships have a certain intensity, for example a common household exists (see also EKMR 07/19/1968, 3110/67, Yb 11, 494 (518); EKMR 02/28/1979, 7912/77, EuGRZ 1981/118; Frowein - Peukert, European Convention on Human Rights, ECHR Commentary, 2nd edition (1996) margin no. 16 to Art. 8; Baumgartner, What forms of coexistence does the constitution protect? ÖJZ 1998, 761; see also Rosenmayer, Residence ban, detention and deportation, ZfV 1988, 1). In the previous ruling practice of the Strasbourg instances, relationships between grandchildren and grandparents (EGMR 13.06.1979, Marckx, EuGRZ 1979, 458; see also EKMR 07.12.1981, B 9071 / 80, X-Schweiz, EuGRZ 1983, 19), between siblings (EKMR 14.03.1980, B 8986/80, EuGRZ 1982, 311) and between uncle or aunt and nephew or niece (EKMR 19.07.1968, 3110/67 , Yb 11, 494 (518); EKMR 02/28/1979, 7912/77, EuGRZ 1981/118; EKMR 07/05/1979, B 8353/78, EuGRZ 1981, 120) recognized as long as there is a certain relationship intensity (see Baumgartner, ÖJZ 1998, 761; Rosenmayer, ZfV 1988, 1).The commission also required the criterion of a certain relationship intensity for the relationship between parents and adult children (EKMR October 6, 1981, B 9202/80, EuGRZ 1983, 215).
According to the established case law of the courts of public law, the public interest from the point of view of the protection and maintenance of public order within the meaning of Article 8 (2) ECHR is of great importance. In their judicature, the Constitutional Court and the Administrative Court affirmed a public interest in the sense of preventing people who were previously only allowed to stay in Germany on the basis of their asylum application from being held in place beyond the duration of the asylum procedure (VfSlg. 17.516 and VwGH June 26, 2007, Zl. 2007/01/0479).
The complainant has no relatives or other close relatives in Austria. The return decision therefore does not constitute an inadmissible interference with the complainant's right to protection of family life.
In the case of a stay based solely on the submission of an asylum application, the decision of the European Court of Human Rights (N. v. United Kingdom of May 27, 2008, No. 26565/05) did not include a stay of ten years as a possible obstacle to expulsion thematized under the aspect of a violation of Art. 8 ECHR.
In its previous decision Nnyanzi against United Kingdom of April 8th, 2008 (No. 21878/06), the ECHR came to the conclusion that when weighing up the interests of the asylum seeker's private life and the interests of the state, different treatment of asylum seekers, those of the residence only due to their status as an asylum seeker, and persons with legal residence are justified, since the residence of an asylum seeker is never safe even during a year-long asylum procedure. In this decision, the ECHR expressly states that an asylum seeker does not have the guaranteed right to enter a country and to settle there. A deportation is therefore always justified if it is in accordance with the law and is based on a reason given in Art. 8 (2) ECHR. In particular, according to the ECHR, the public interest of every state in effective immigration control is in any case higher than the private life of an asylum seeker; even if the asylum seeker is studying in the host country, is socially integrated and has lived in the host country for 10 years.
Although the complainant has been in the federal territory with interruptions since 2012, he has no concrete integration efforts to demonstrate.
Despite his several years of residence in the federal territory, he speaks little German, has not completed any German courses, is not active in clubs or other organizations, lives with a person who comes from the complainant's cultural area, whereas the complainant did not claim any friendships with Austrians. In addition, the complainant's stay of several years in the federal territory must be countered by the fact that this was only legal for a short time during the asylum procedure, but since the decision of the Asylum Court on December 19, 2012, this has been illegal, which is why ties entered into in the federal territory cannot weigh heavily.
In addition, the complainant nevertheless spent the vast majority of his life in India, where he was socialized and has relatives, whereas in Germany he has no family members. Regarding his work as a helper in delivering newspapers, it should be noted that no significant integration in the labor market can be derived from this (see VwGH 06/11/2014, 2013/22/0356), especially since the complainant carries out this activity illegally. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that the complainant did not present any specific submissions regarding advanced integration insofar as he had shown a special social commitment or he was connected in a special way with the conditions in the federal territory in cultural and social terms. To the detriment of the complainant, it must be assessed in particular that he had been staying illegally in the federal territory for many years and that he would have been obliged to leave the federal territory as early as 2013, which is why, in view of an asylum procedure that had already been concluded negatively, he could not trust that he would have been through the second Unfounded application will be able to obtain residence status (see VfSlg 18.224 / 2007, 18.382 / 2008, 19.086 / 2010, 19.752 / 2013). The public interests in the termination of residence, which manifest themselves in particular in the interest in compliance with foreign law regulations as well as in the fact that the asylum law (and the temporary residence permit associated with the filing of an asylum application) may not serve to circumvent the general regulations of an orderly immigration system, weigh in In the present case, based on the considerations set out above, the complainant's interests in remaining in Austria are far more serious. The Constitutional Court also points out that a stay obtained solely through persistent disregard of foreign and legal residence regulations cannot give rise to a legal claim under Article 8 of the ECHR. A different view would even lead to a preference for this group over those who behave in accordance with the law (VfSlg. 19.086 / 2010 mwH).
It is therefore to be assumed that the complainant's interests in remaining in the federal territory have little weight compared to the public interest in compliance with the provisions regulating the entry and residence of foreigners from the point of view of the protection of public order, according to case law of the Administrative Court is of great importance, take a back seat. The decision to return was therefore urgently required in the present case and is also not disproportionate (see VwGH February 25, 2010, 2009/21/0142; March 18, 2010, 2010/22/0023).
Pursuant to Section 52 (9) FPG, the Federal Office must simultaneously determine with a return decision that a deportation of a third-country national to one or more specific states is permissible pursuant to Section 46 FPG, unless this is not possible for reasons for which the third-country national is responsible.
According to Section 50 (1) FPG, the deportation of aliens to a state is not permitted if this results in Art. 2 or 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), Federal Law Gazette No. 210/1958, or Protocol No. 6 or No. 13 to the Convention in order to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms through the abolition of the death penalty would be violated or would pose a serious threat to life or integrity as a civil person as a result of arbitrary violence in the context of an international or domestic conflict.
According to Section 50 (2) FPG, deportation to a state is not permitted if there are valid reasons to believe that their life or their freedom there for reasons of their race, their religion, their nationality, their membership of a certain social group or their own political views would be threatened (Art. 33 Z 1 of the Convention on the Legal Status of Refugees, Federal Law Gazette No. 55/1955, in the version of the Protocol on the Legal Status of Refugees, Federal Law Gazette No. 78/1974), unless there is a domestic alternative to flight (Section 11 AsylG 2005).
According to Section 50 (3) FPG, deportation to a country is not permitted as long as the deportation is contrary to the recommendation of a provisional measure by the European Court of Human Rights.
The complainant's deportation to the country of origin is admissible, since, according to the reasons for the rejection of his applications for international protection, there are no circumstances that would make the deportation inadmissible within the meaning of Section 50 FPG.
According to § 55 Paragraph 1a FPG, there is no deadline for voluntary departure in the event of a rejection decision according to § 68 AVG.
Regarding ruling point VII. Of the contested decision:
Section 53 of the FPG, headed "Entry Ban", reads:
"(1) With a return decision, the Federal Office can issue an entry ban. The entry ban is the instruction to third-country nationals not to enter the territory of the member states for a specified period of time and not to stay there.
(2) An entry ban in accordance with Paragraph 1 is, subject to Paragraph 3, to be issued for a maximum of five years. When assessing the duration of the entry ban, the Federal Office must take into account the previous behavior of the third-country national and to what extent the stay of the third-country national endangers public order or security or runs counter to other public interests listed in Art. 8 (2) ECHR. This is particularly to be assumed if the third-country national
1. because of an administrative offense in accordance with Section 20 (2) of the Road Traffic Act 1960 (StVO), Federal Law Gazette No. 159, in conjunction with Section 26 (3) of the Driving License Act (FSG), Federal Law Gazette I No. 120/1997, in accordance with Section 99 Para. 1, 1a, 1b or 2 StVO, according to § 37 Abs. 3 or 4 FSG, according to § 366 Abs. 1 Z 1 of the trade regulations 1994 (GewO), Federal Law Gazette No. 194, in relation to a licensed, bound trade, according to §§ 81 or 82 of the SPG, in accordance with §§ 9 or 14 in conjunction with § 19 of the Assembly Act 1953, Federal Law Gazette No. 98, or for a violation of the Border Control Act, the Registration Act, the Hazardous Goods Transport Act or the Aliens Employment Act has been legally punished;
2. Has been legally punished for an administrative offense with a fine of at least 1,000 euros or a primary imprisonment sentence;
3. has been legally punished for a violation of this Federal Act or the Settlement and Residence Act, provided that this is not a violation mentioned in Paragraph 3;
4. has been legally punished for deliberately committed financial offenses or for deliberate violations of foreign exchange regulations;
5. has been legally punished for a violation of the regulations governing prostitution;
6. is unable to prove possession of the means of subsistence;
7. is entered during an employment that he should not have been allowed to exercise according to the AuslBG, unless the third-country national would have been allowed to exercise another employment for the same employer according to the provisions of the Aliens Employment Act and for the employment in which the third-country national was entered, no change of purpose would have been necessary or a change of purpose would have been permissible;
8. has entered into a marriage or established a registered partnership and has opted for the issue or retention of a residence permit, for the acquisition or maintenance of a right of residence under Union law, for the acquisition of Austrian citizenship, for the purpose of access to the domestic labor market or for the prevention of measures to terminate residence Marriage or registered partnership, but did not lead a common family life with the spouse or registered partner within the meaning of Art. 8 ECHR or
9. was adopted instead of a child and the issuing or retention of a residence title, the acquisition or maintenance of a right of residence under Union law, the acquisition of Austrian citizenship, access to the domestic labor market or the withholding of measures to terminate residence are the sole or predominant reason for adopting a child was, but he has deceived the court about the true relationships with the adoptive parents.
(3) An entry ban pursuant to Paragraph 1 shall be issued for a maximum of ten years, in the cases of Nos. 5 to 9 also indefinitely, if certain facts justify the assumption that the stay of the third-country national poses a serious threat to public order or represents security. A certain fact that is relevant when assessing the duration of the entry ban in addition to the other public interests named in Art. 8 (2) ECHR shall apply in particular if 1. a third-country national has been given an unconditional imprisonment by a court of at least three months has been sentenced to a conditional or partially conditional imprisonment of at least six months or at least once for criminal acts based on the same harmful inclination;
2. a third-country national has been legally convicted by a court of an intentional act committed within three months of entering the country;
3. a third-country national has been finally convicted of pimping;
4. a third-country national has been legally punished or convicted of a repeat offense or a criminal act within the meaning of this Federal Act or the Settlement and Residence Act;
5. a third-country national has been sentenced by a court to an unconditional imprisonment of at least five years;
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